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Interconnections Between Technological and Policy Innovation: Re-evaluating the 
Evidence-Base Supporting the Provision of CCTV in the UK 
 
Abstract 
This article critically examines developments in CCTV (Closed Circuit Television) policy and 
provision in the UK, with specific reference to the ‘evidence-based’ approach to policy-
making and service provision.  The main features of the CCTV revolutions are examined 
from a policy perspective, so that intertwined changes in purpose and technological 
configuration are illuminated.  The underlying premise of evidence-based policy is that a 
robust and reliable evidence base exists and that this body of knowledge is used rationally to 
inform changes in policy and practice.  However, in the case of CCTV, there are a range of 
issues associated with the evidence base which seem to contradict the logic of continued 
CCTV provision.  In this article these issues are explored through what the author calls five 
CCTV fallacies.  These fallacies raise important questions, not just about the ongoing 
provision of CCTV, but the nature of modern public policy making procedures. 
 
1. Introduction 
CCTV cameras are a key part of modern society, both in terms of their widespread presence 
in public places and also as a core part of community safety, policing and national security 
public policy.  Despite the widespread use of such systems there are a number of issues 
central to the development of CCTV policy, which raise questions about the rationale of their 
continued provision and their perceived benefit to society.  In this article the provision of 
CCTV is critically assessed in relation to the development of ‘evidence-based’ public policy 
and services under New Labour - which suggests that decisions about the allocation of 
scarce resources are determined by the existence of performance related measures and 
information, or ‘evidence’.  For CCTV, the evidence base is usually considered to be 
reductions in crime and the ‘fear of crime’, as measured by crime statistics.  However, this 
evidence base is contested are there are doubts about the ability of CCTV to have the 
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impact on crime that many take for granted.  Consequently, if CCTV cannot be justified in 
relation to its impact on crime then we have to ask important questions about the explanation 
for its introduction and continued use.   
 
This article addresses these concerns by re-examining the emergence of CCTV policy and 
provision, and by reassessing the evidence base and the rationale behind the cameras.  It is 
argued, that the emphasis on crime statistics can be considered a ‘red herring’, which does 
not fully explain the motivations behind, or the true beneficiaries of, CCTV.  In the UK the 
evidence base is being debated, not in terms of the technologies effectiveness or impact, but 
because of the aging nature of existing CCTV systems, with many systems now in excess of 
ten years old, and the financial costs associated with their upkeep and replacement.  The 
financial costs associated with upkeep is leading to many public agencies reassessing their 
provision and also the costs and benefits of their systems – especially when they are 
delivered by multiple agencies and where CCTV footage is used for multiple purposes.  For 
public policy-makers and service providers it is apparent that the reassessment of the 
evidence base is as much about a redistribution of the costs of delivering CCTV as about its 
effectiveness and impact.  This raises additional questions about the evidence base on 
which CCTV policy and practice is founded. 
 
Central to the article is the assertion that a focus on policy, achieved by reassessing the 
evidence base surrounding CCTV policy and practice, highlights the interlinked nature of 
technological and policy innovation.  In the case of CCTV, the provision of this innovative 
surveillance technology is dependant upon the development of innovative public policy, and 
policy processes which are supportive of this new technological ‘application’ despite, or 
regardless of, any concerns about the evidence base behind these systems.  This 
represents a significant development for public policy as it suggests that for certain new 
technologies the evidence base can be shaped, manipulated or possibly even ignored, in 
order to realise technological implementation.  This suggestion undermines our fundamental 
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assumptions about the importance of rationality in modern policy processes.  Policy 
innovation in this scenario draws our attention to powerful forces in the policy-making 
process, forces that desire and ensure technological diffusion despite limited knowledge 
about their impact or consequences. 
 
The remainder of the article is split into 7 main parts.  Part 2 outlines some of the key 
features of CCTV provision in the UK.  Parts 3 and 4 set out an explicit ‘policy’ approach to 
comprehending the emergence of CCTV.  Part 3 presents a review of the emergence of a 
discreet CCTV policy in the UK and highlights linkages with changes in the pattern of CCTV 
diffusion.  Part 4 explores the emergence of ‘evidence-based policy’, a key approach to 
policy-making in the UK following the election of New Labour in 1997.  Part 5 critically 
examines the evidence-base surrounding CCTV through the exploration of a number of 
CCTV ‘fallacies’.  These fallacies raise significant questions about the evidence based 
supporting CCTV provision in the UK and about the rationality of modern public policy-
making processes.  Part 6 reassesses the usefulness of the CCTV evidence-base in the UK.  
Part 7 offers some concluding comments.   
 
The article is based on the author’s longstanding research in the area of CCTV policy 
processes.  The analysis discussed in this article derives from ongoing policy and document 
collection and review.  The empirical evidence which guides the commentary presented in 
the latter part of the article derives from interviews with CCTV policy-makers and service 
providers in Scotland, undertaken in autumn 2007.  This research explored the development 
of CCTV policy and systems in public places and the key issues surrounding CCTV 
provision. 
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2. The CCTV Revolution 
The rapid diffusion of CCTV in the UK has been recognised by many (see for example, the 
special issue on ‘The politics of CCTV in Europe and beyond’ of Surveillance and Society1 
[36]).  Since the early 1990’s CCTV has proliferated, especially in town and city centres [11, 
13, 17, 30, 42], but also in residential and other public settings [39, 42].  They have been 
introduced for public safety, to assist in ‘the fight against crime’, and to deter and detect 
crime, disorder and antisocial behaviour, and help reduce the ‘fear of crime’.  In this respect 
CCTV has been very popular and has been supported by politicians, policy-makers and 
citizens.  Consequently, and as a result of their popularity and perceived effectiveness CCTV 
provision has been further supported by political rhetoric and financial assistance from 
central government.  The extent of the proliferation has led some commentators to argue 
that the UK is now the most surveyed country in the world [30] with an estimated five million 
CCTV cameras in operation [29].  Although the precise number of cameras can be debated 
the existence of the CCTV ‘revolution’ cannot, and the surveillance practices and 
relationships embedded in CCTV technology are today a key feature of modern society.  
CCTV is now ubiquitous, a normal part of everyday life, citizens willingly acquiesce as 
surveillance subjects, and seem quite happy to forgo some personal privacy in return for 
greater levels of personal safety and security. 
 
One notable aspect of the way CCTV has diffused across society is the way in which CCTV 
systems have rapidly spread despite concerns about their impact on individuals and society.  
Issues that have arisen, include the perceived: effect on civil liberties and individuals privacy, 
individuals ‘rights’ freedom of movement and anonymity, changes in behaviour arising from 
intense levels of visual monitoring, citizen-state relations, and the effectiveness of new and 
untried technological systems.  Together, these concerns raise significant questions about 
the rationale for widespread use of CCTV and the extent of rationality in the public policy-
making process [42].  Nevertheless, the unequivocal support for CCTV, evidenced by the 
                                                 
1 Surveillance and Society, URL: http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/ojs/index.php/journal 
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results of public satisfaction surveys [2, 8] and the overwhelming belief in the capabilities of 
the technology have remained intact and have overridden concerns about the extension of 
surveillance bases technologies. 
 
The CCTV revolution can be understood from a number of different perspectives.  Perhaps 
the simplest is as a technological revolution, where advances in new ICTs have enabled a 
configuration of camera, information and communication technologies into a useful 
surveillance tool.  This perspective emphasises the technical specification and capabilities of 
systems and the actual number of systems in use.  Linked to this perspective is the 
criminological perspective which sees CCTV as a crime prevention tool and part of the 
criminal justice and policing system.  This perspective focuses on the effectiveness of CCTV 
in reducing and deterring crime and disorder, for making citizens feel safer, and for ensuring 
safety and security.  Sociological perspectives tend to focus on aspects of control and 
power, and highlight changes in human behaviour and the nature of society arising from new 
surveillance based relationships, and the social construction of surveillance.  These three 
perspectives, the technical, the criminological, and the sociological, dominate our thinking 
about CCTV.  Yet there are other less prominent, but important, perspectives which offer 
interesting insights into the CCTV revolution.  Lawyers focus on the evolution of legal 
constructs, such as data protection and privacy, and their relevance to new technological 
domains, whilst political scientists focus on the political setting of the revolution and 
government activity.  Although all perspectives are valid they do not necessarily offer a 
comprehensive explanation for the CCTV revolution or the continuing support for CCTV 
technologies.  An alternative is to take a policy perspective, this is illuminating because it 
highlights the complex interactions between government, policy-makers, the media, service 
providers and users, and technological and policy developments.  Such an approach 
highlights the intertwined power relations and social interactions between different actors 
and institutions in the governance and public policy process and points to CCTV as an 
important social and policy construct and not just a technological artefact.  Elsewhere, I have 
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described the development of CCTV policy and practice as a ‘techno-policy diffusion 
process’, where the diffusion of technological systems and policy have fused and evolved 
together [40].  This is pertinent for a new technology like CCTV as very little is known about 
its impacts or the consequences of its use.  As a result, policy development and 
implementation evolve around a belief in what the technology ‘will’ achieve and not what it 
already has achieved.  This article takes the policy perspective further by reconsidering the 
CCTV revolution in relation to the evolution of both CCTV policy and CCTV diffusion.  This is 
achieved by assessing the emergence and development of CCTV policy and reconsidering 
CCTV policy and provision in light of ‘evidenced-based’ approaches to policy-making and 
service delivery that have dominated the public policy environment since the mid 1990’s. 
 
3. The Emergence of CCTV Policy in the UK 
It is generally understood that policy can take a number of forms and does not necessarily 
rely on the existence of a formal written policy document.  Policy can be a concerted 
direction of action, the coordinated deployment of resources, or just a statement of intended 
action [19, 20].  For CCTV, it is evident that the central Government funding programmes set 
up in the 1990’s, allied to the publication of guidance documents and political rhetoric in 
favour of CCTV, signalled the emergence of CCTV as a distinct policy area.  For some, the 
emergence of CCTV as a discreet policy field dominated the crime prevention policy 
environment to such an extent that in the late 1990’s it was not part of a broader crime 
prevention policy, it was ‘the’ policy [18].  The growth of CCTV as a policy area culminated 
recently in the publication of a formal written document entitled the ‘National CCTV Strategy’ 
in 2007 [12].   
 
Initially the emphasis of CCTV policy was crime prevention and detection, reducing citizens’ 
perceived fear of crime, and protecting commercial interests.  Over time, the policy has 
shifted, so that CCTV policy was also about reducing antisocial and undesirable behaviour.  
This has encouraged the provision of CCTV beyond town and city centres and into 
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residential and other public places.  Most recently, following 9/11 and 7/7, the policy has 
shifted again, so that the emphasis is now also on national security and deterring terrorism.  
Allied to these policy shifts have been a series of technical changes which have altered the 
capabilities of CCTV systems.  Advances in computerisation have enabled number plate, 
movement and facial recognition systems to be used alongside human operatives, and 
advances in communications have led to the integration and networking of previously 
separate systems.  Recognising this policy shift is important as it demonstrates how a 
technology introduced for one purpose can actually shift and be used for another.  This shift 
is often referred to as ‘policy creep’ and by surveillance theorists as ‘surveillance creep’ [27].  
For CCTV the result is greater levels and intensities of surveillance as different surveillance 
purposes and activities have accumulated around and are embedded in technological 
systems.  Cynics could argue the intention was always to have an integrated nationwide 
network of surveillance cameras, but that this initially would have been very unpopular, so 
the solution has been to carefully manage the policy process in a way that maintained public 
support at the same time as ensuring technological diffusion.   
 
Interestingly, developments in CCTV policy can be mapped alongside developments in 
CCTV provision to show a co-evolution where policy and technology has evolve together 
over time.  This demonstrates that policy and diffusion are closely intertwined processes.  
Perhaps this is not surprising, as it would be hard to imagine the diffusion of such a powerful 
surveillance technology without some form of national policy.  Table 1 outlines three CCTV 
policy eras, chronologically they are: policy ‘innovation and experimentation’, policy 
‘acceptance and expansion’ and ‘retrenchment and centralisation’.  The table shows that in 
each era the policy environment evolved, with a shift in policy focus and a shift in the 
emphasis of CCTV diffusion. 
 
In the earliest era, the era of policy ‘innovation and experimentation’, the CCTV policy 
environment can be characterised by a desire by central Government to establish CCTV as 
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a viable policy option for crime prevention, and for the formation of a policy environment and 
society malleable to the provision of public surveillance.  In this era small scale systems, 
operated by police forces or local authorities in town centres and car parks were established.  
At this stage it was not clear that the technology would be effective or whether public support 
would be forthcoming.  The focus was therefore on testing potential systems, spreading the 
message about their benefits, and asserting the message that CCTV was an effective tool in 
the ‘fight against crime’.  Policy-makers in this era were experimenting, developing a new 
policy focus based completely on the perceived benefits of a new technology. 
 
+++ Insert Table 1 here +++ 
 
In the following era, from the mid 1990’s to the mid 2000’s, CCTV proliferated into a wide 
range of public places.  By now the dominant perception of CCTV was that it worked. This 
view was reinforced at every opportunity allowing the policy focus to extend from crime 
prevention to include the deterrence of antisocial and undesirable behaviour.  Features of 
this era include extensive central Government funding and guidance, and local service 
provision and operation.  Most public space CCTV is now owned, monitored and managed 
by local authorities, often in partnership with police forces and other key public agencies.  A 
notable result of local provision is the emergence of multiple systems which are technically 
different and independent. In this era, CCTV became a local policy initiative and influential 
policy networks emerged around the technology as the policy area expanded and achieved 
national and local recognition.   
 
From mid 2000 onwards, in the era of ‘retrenchment and centralisation’, CCTV policy and 
practice is well established, yet concerns start to emerge about the maintenance costs 
associated with CCTV.  Typically, local authorises fund the operation and maintenance of 
CCTV and by mid 2000 many cameras were in need of replacement.  Also, in this era there 
is a policy shift where the focus of provision shifts to address concerns with national security 
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and terrorism.  So, not only is CCTV intended to meet crime prevention and community 
safety objectives, but also policy objectives associated with the prevention of terrorism, 
intelligence gathering and national security.  This has led to a desire by central government 
for CCTV policy and practice to be standardised, with integrated and centrally controlled 
systems, so that intelligence collected via CCTV and so that images can reliably used as 
evidence in a court of law.  By autumn 2007, the Home Office had published the ‘National 
CCTV Strategy’ [12] which outlines the role of CCTV in crime prevention, criminal justice and 
for the prevention of terrorism.  It stresses the role played by CCTV in serious crime and 
terrorist incidents and argues that a more coordinated standardised approach to CCTV 
would make it ‘more effective’.  The main focus is to consolidate technical aspects of 
systems, to standardise procedures and technologies, and to create coordination.  The core 
underlying theme of the strategy is a reflection of the piecemeal provision of CCTV up until 
this point and a desire by central government to use the technology for new anti-terrorism 
purposes.  This has led to a reassessment of the technical capabilities and efficacy of 
systems and also the introduction new innovative computerised surveillance practices, such 
as facial and number plate recognition. 
 
Deconstructing CCTV provision into three policy eras is interesting because as it illuminates 
the importance of the evolving policy environment for the ongoing provision of CCTV.  It 
shows the motivation for CCTV emanated from central government, but that its provision 
could not be achieved without local service delivery, and that recent efforts to standardise 
and centralise technological provision are also to meet policy objectives emanating from 
central Government.  It is clear then that the CCTV policy arena has been dominated by 
central Government.  Throughout the eras CCTV has been a high profile policy.  This may 
be because of shifts in policy and use, especially the new focus on national security and 
terrorism, which has dominated the political agenda, it may be because CCTV is simply a 
high profile technology and policy, or it may be because the continuing presence of the 
technology requires constant moral justification and support.  Regardless of which 
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explanation is most robust it is unusual for a single policy to retain such a high profile over 
such a lengthy period.  Traditional approaches to the study of policy suggest policy-making 
is a cyclical process, where policy’s ‘come and go’, and that they are contentious and 
debated for relatively short periods of time as they are eventually replaced on the policy 
agenda by other unrelated issues and policies.  Down’s ‘Issue Attention Cycle’ [10] and 
Kingdon’s ‘Policy Streams’ [25] are good examples of this approach. 
 
4. Evidence-Based Policy 
The period in which CCTV has diffused has coincided with the emergence of an approach to 
policy-making which has become known as ‘evidence-based’ policy.  The basic premise is 
that public policy and services should be based on, and influenced by, robust evidence.  This 
approach to policy-making has gown in significance since the election of New Labour in 
1997.  The ‘Modernising Government’ White Paper published in 1999 stated that 
Government; “must produce policies that really deal with problems, that are forward-looking 
and shaped by evidence rather than a response to short-term pressures; that tackle causes 
not symptoms” [4].  Modernising Government heralded New Labour’s intention to ensure 
policy was based on sound and comprehensive understandings of the evidence available 
and to develop a strategy to maintain and update the evidence base for future strategy, 
policy and service delivery.   This approach has become important to all levels of 
government and all service areas [6].  It can be seen as a response to the need to improve 
the quality of decision-making and to ensure decisions are not motivated by political 
pressures.  The perceived benefit of evidence-based policy-making is better policy and 
consequently better and more effective public services. 
 
There are different approaches to evidence-based policy-making, usually it is conceived to 
be a perspective to policy development which utilises rigorous analytical techniques to 
develop and maintain a robust evidence base from which to develop policy options [6].  It is 
not new to suggest that policy and practice should be informed by evidence and there is a 
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general belief that the public policy process should always strive to be ‘rational’.  However, 
the key to the evidence-based approach to policy is the issue of whether the evidence itself 
and the processes through which the evidence is translated into public services are 
sufficiently robust and valid, and consequently useful, when making decisions about the 
deployment of resources [5].  According to Nutley et al policy orientated evidence is usually 
considered to have three elements; hard data, analytical reasoning, and stakeholder opinion 
[31].  The benefit of this tripartite approach is that if there is any weakness in the hard data, 
then policy-makers can fall back on the analysis that underpins the data.  If there is any 
weakness in the analysis, then the policy-makers can go back to the stakeholder base in 
order to understand different interpretations of the data/analysis.  In line with this view the 
Cabinet Office’s ‘Better Policy-Making’ report [3] identified an evidence-based perspective to 
policy as one which; reviews existing research, commissions new research, consults experts 
(or consultants), and considers a wide range of properly appraised options. 
 
By taking an evidence-based approach to policy-making and service development the 
Government has adopted a pragmatic non-ideological stance which has resulted in the 
adoption of policies that previously would have been unacceptable to a ‘socialist’ 
Government.  Additionally, the approach also provides new sources of information beyond 
that traditionally available from civil servants.  In practice the evidence-based approach has 
led to a proliferation of performance measures, ex post evaluations of policy and services, 
and action based experiments to test new initiatives.  These practices have become popular 
for evaluating the effectiveness of new technologies, where little prior evidence exists, and 
where there is a need to create a knowledge base from which policy can be assessed. 
 
Critics of this approach to policy argue that the term ‘evidence-based’ is misleading as it 
downgrades the subtle and pervasive influence of politics on the policy process, and instead 
argue that terms like ‘evidence influenced’ or ‘evidence aware’ are more appropriate [31].  
Clarence [5] goes so far as to argue that it is inappropriate to assume that evidence can 
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provide objective answers to inherently political policy issues and that it is too simplistic to 
assume that policy-making can be a more rational decision-making process if it is influenced 
primarily by the weight of evidence.  Instead, politics and policy-making reflect the art of 
‘muddling through’ [26], and often it is politics and not evidence which is the driving force for 
policy development [7].  There are also disputes about what constitutes evidence or whether 
certain items of evidence are more important than others.  Some authors stress that it is 
unwise to assume that evidence is value free as it embodies the values of vested interests in 
the policy-making process and society more generally - evidence then can never be 
objective as all knowledge is relative and developed in social contexts [32].  Nutely et al [31] 
argue that there are four requirements for improving evidence use in government and public 
services.  Firstly, an agreement as to what counts as evidence and in what circumstances, 
secondly, the strategic creation of evidence in priority areas and the systematic 
accumulation of evidence in the form of robust bodies of knowledge, thirdly, the effective 
dissemination of evidence to where it is most needed, and fourthly, initiatives to ensure the 
integration of evidence into policy and to encourage the utilisation of evidence in practice. 
 
The evidenced-based approach suggests that the diffusion of CCTV is supported by a robust 
evidence base which shows service improvements resulting from the deployment of the 
technology.  For CCTV, this approach points to a general agreement about the validity of 
evidence supporting CCTV, the widespread diffusion of this evidence, and that within the 
CCTV policy environment the evidence is used to support ongoing service evaluation and 
provision.  Here the evidence base consists of performance measures, crime statistics, 
public perception surveys and cost-benefit analysis, all of which are used to support 
provision.  It is not unreasonable to assume that the widespread adoption of CCTV implies 
and demonstrates the reliability of the evidence base, as in the modern era of non-political, 
ultra-rational policy and services, this can be the only possible explanation for the dramatic 
emergence of such a new high profile policy/technology.  However, a careful reassessment 
of this evidence brings the nature of evidence-based policy-making into question.  This is 
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achieved in the next part of the article by exploring five elements of CCTV policy, which I 
have labelled five CCTV ‘fallacies’.  A summary of the five fallacies is presented in Table 2.  
These fallacies raise questions about the evidence base supporting CCTV provision in the 
UK and concerns about the rationality of modern public policy-making processes.  
 
5. Five CCTV Fallacies 
 
+++ Insert Table 3 Here +++ 
 
Fallacy Number One. CCTV cameras work  
The first fallacy relates to whether CCTV cameras work in delivering their primary policy 
objective – reductions in crime and disorder.  Here, the evidence is inconclusive and 
disputed.  Anecdotal evidence and provider analysis of crime statistics in the era of 
innovation and experimentation pointed to CCTV being a very effective tool.  However, even 
in this era criminologists were raising questions about the perceived link between CCTV and 
crime reduction [9, 33, 34].  More recent and comprehensive studies continue to doubt the 
effectiveness of CCTV.  Systematic reviews suggest that CCTV ‘work’ in certain 
circumstances and that the effectiveness of the cameras has consistently been overplayed 
[1, 43].  Gill et al [14] undertook fourteen in-depth case studies of a variety of CCTV systems 
in a variety of locations.  Of the schemes studied only one showed a decrease in crime that 
was statistically significant and which might be related to CCTV.  Gill and Spriggs [15] 
consolidate this research into an overall assessment of CCTV, “It would be easy to 
conclude…that CCTV is not effective: the majority of the schemes evaluated did not reduce 
crime and even where there was a reduction this was mostly not due to CCTV” [15: 36].  
This view is further reinforced by the most recent research published in America [24].  
Groombridge [18] takes the argument further by suggesting there is no rigorously consistent 
evidence to suggest CCTV cameras work and consequently they cannot offer value-for-
money.  He goes on to argue that if we are to judge CCTV on its impact on crime, then; “the 
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Home Office, and therefore the Treasury, has wasted enormous sums of tax payer’s money 
on the deployment of CCTV” [18: 74].  In relation to crime prevention there is an assumption 
that CCTV works, however, the reality is that it may make a useful contribution to crime 
control in certain circumstances, but in general it is fallacy to assume CCTV reduces crime. 
 
Fallacy Number Two. CCTV is everywhere 
The second established fallacy is that CCTV cameras are everywhere and that we are 
constantly under the surveillance of CCTV.  At the start of the article I argued that the 
diffusion of CCTV into public places across the UK was generally recognised and accepted.  
However, although public agencies have invested heavily in CCTV, the vast majority are 
privately owned and operated by the commercial sector and are located in shopping centres 
and other privately owned facilities.  Publicly owned and operated systems are far fewer in 
number.  The first ‘national survey’ of existing and planned local authority CCTV systems 
discovered that 86% of UK local authorities had installed a CCTV system and that in total 
there were approximately 1,300 systems with 21,000 cameras [40, 41]).  These figures are a 
lot lower than the five million cameras estimated by Norris [29].  Today, in Scotland, there is 
still one local authority that does not operate a public space CCTV system.  So, although 
CCTV cameras have proliferated in number it is actually a fallacy to assume that there are 
large numbers of public space, publicly owned and operated systems. 
 
Fallacy Number Three. Citizens want CCTV  
The third fallacy is that citizens want CCTV.  This fallacy is more difficult to establish as there 
is clearly widespread support for CCTV.  It is based on the proposition that fallacy number 
one is valid.  Public perception surveys show unequivocal support for CCTV [2, 8] and 
anecdotal evidence shows citizens putting pressure on their elected representative to install 
systems [40].  It is also apparent that there is some resistance to the use of CCTV and the 
emergent surveillance society [37].  However, public support for CCTV is based on fallacy 
number one, a belief that the cameras work in reducing crime.  Norris and Armstrong note, 
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“there is a common assumption: (that) CCTV actually produces the effects claimed for it…an 
unquestioning belief in the power of the technology” [30: 9].  The view that crime reduction 
follows CCTV provision has been successfully disseminated across society and has filtered 
down into the general consciousness of the population.  Here, the myth is that citizens want 
CCTV, but in doing so they assume it is a technology that delivers a certain outcome.  
Presumably, if there was greater awareness about fallacy number one the limitations of 
CCTV would be more widely understood and support for CCTV would diminish, resting in 
fallacy number three being exposed.   
 
Fallacy Number Four. Citizens understand the technological capabilities of CCTV 
Related to fallacy number three is the fourth fallacy about our awareness of the technological 
capabilities of CCTV.  This too is also clearly linked to the general belief that the cameras 
‘work’ (fallacy number one).  Although there is widespread public support for CCTV, 
recognition that cameras exist, and knowledge about what they are there to achieve, there is 
very little awareness about the extent to which systems differ in terms of their the technical 
capabilities and operation [40].  There is a general impression that CCTV systems are 
constantly manned and that following an incident an appropriate response will be 
forthcoming.  However, in many cases this is unlikely to happen as most CCTV surveillance 
systems do not have this responsive capability and consequently the surveillance 
expectations of the surveyed are not being met.  I have argued elsewhere, that although we 
use the generic label ‘CCTV’, schemes can broadly be categorised into three types of 
system, those that are proactive, reactive, and non-active [39], and that the type of system 
and its technological capabilities determine the levels of monitoring and the intensity of 
surveillance.  The key differences between each of these types are explained in Table 3. 
 
+++ Insert Table 3 Here +++ 
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This typology is a hierarchy of sophistication.  The least sophisticated ‘systems’ are non-
active systems that act as a visual deterrent through the physical presence of passive 
cameras.  They are non-active because there is no monitoring or recording capability.  
Instead they create the illusion of surveillance because citizens feel like they are being 
watched when actually they are not.  The reactive type links cameras to recording, storage 
and playback facilities allowing access to footage after an event or incident has occurred.  
With this type there is no live surveillance but they are seen as particularly useful for 
identifying the perpetrators of criminal acts and in providing evidence for prosecutions.  The 
most sophisticated type of CCTV system include an integrated dedicated surveillance and 
communications control centre staffed by dedicated local authority or police operatives with 
direct communications links with the local police force, thereby allowing for real-time 
continuous surveillance.  The divergence in the different types of system mean that it is 
almost impossible for the surveyed to have any idea about whether they are being surveyed 
or not even if they are aware of the presence of surveillance cameras.  Central to this fallacy 
then is the assumption that the surveyed have a good understanding of the surveillance 
process, when in reality a multitude of different surveillance practices and technological 
capabilities exist.   
 
Fallacy Number Five. CCTV is there to protect us and to reduce crime 
Fallacy number five raises questions about the purpose behind the use of CCTV.  CCTV is 
typically understood to be a crime prevention and detection tool - Tony McNulty, Minister of 
State for Security, recently stated “I see CCTV as an important tool in the Government’s 
crime-fighting strategy” [12: 4].  However, CCTV also impacts upon lower level non-criminal 
activities often referred to as antisocial and undesirable behaviour.  The evidence suggests 
that CCTV is more effective in deterring undesirable behaviour than reducing crime and 
disorder [15].  This points to CCTV having multiple purposes, not just crime prevention and 
detection, but also in delivering community safety and a better living environment.  In part 3 I 
argued that the policy focus of CCTV has shifted as the technology has diffused, from crime 
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prevention, to community safety and on to national security.  CCTV also fulfils a number of 
other purposes, it is a useful tool for: directing and controlling police resources, for gathering 
intelligence and monitoring suspect individuals, for making people ‘feel’ safer, and also for 
generating reliable evidence for use in prosecutions.  This range of activity clearly 
demonstrates that the provision of CCTV is multi-purpose and intended to meet multiple 
policy objectives.  This is an interesting point, because if CCTV is a multi-purpose policy 
then why to we rely one dimensional performance indicators, namely crime statistics, to 
make judgements about the effectiveness of CCTV?  Groombridge [18] concurs with this 
proposition by claiming that the objectives of CCTV systems are often not clear and are 
reliant on unreliable crime statistics.  Central to this fallacy is the assumption that the primary 
purpose of CCTV is to reduce crime, when actually this is only one of a range of policy 
objectives. 
 
5. Reconsidering the CCTV Evidence-Base 
The five CCTV fallacies discussed above raise important questions for the evidence-base on 
which CCTV policy and practice is based, although CCTV remains an important and popular 
policy.  Questions about the purpose of CCTV, the effectiveness of systems, and the extent 
to which the general public comprehend and are aware of surveillance capabilities and 
practices, suggest that the evidence-base is ill-informed and unreliable.  If this is the case, 
then not only is the evidence-base problematic, but it also is increasingly difficult to explain 
CCTV as a rational logic policy.  If the CCTV fallacies presented in part 4 are accepted, then 
this could suggest that the evidence-base is misunderstood, misused or even ignored by 
policy-makers in the policy process.  Reconsidering the evidence base in this way also leads 
us to ask why policy-makers, service providers, citizens and the media are not more 
questioning about the rationale behind CCTV provision, and why CCTV remains such a 
popular policy?   
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A number of local authorities and other CCTV service providers are reviewing their CCTV 
provision.  This has not driven by concerns with the evidence-base, but by financial 
considerations arising from the financial costs associated with running and maintaining 
systems.  Local authorities are finding it increasingly difficult to fund service delivery and are 
starting to question the use of these systems by other agencies and for non-local authority 
purposes.  In general, most local authority (and partnership) schemes have been set up to 
improve the quality of life of local citizens and to regenerate local areas with a focus on 
community safety.  The use of CCTV for policing [16], for national security and to provide 
images for investigations and prosecutions, provide additional alternative benefits to other 
public agencies who do not necessarily contribute financially to the maintenance of systems.  
This issue is heightened by operational agreements which allow police forces and other 
security services to assume operational control of local schemes.  Financial concerns are 
also encouraging CCTV service providers to consider new and innovative ways of raising 
finance.  For example, the use of CCTV to detect car parking and road tax offences and to 
issue fines is a good example of surveillance creep.  From 31 March 2008 local authorities in 
England can use CCTV to issue postal fines for car parking offences in surveyed areas.  
Additionally, schemes with large centralised control rooms are starting to charge individual 
services and agencies for the monitoring carried out.  The reassessment of provision around 
cost is leading to the integration of systems, to reduce manpower costs, and the introduction 
of computerised surveillance systems where the monitoring is automated and not done by 
human operatives [35], again leading to a reduction in the manpower costs associated with 
operating systems. 
 
Interestingly, these developments compliment the Home Office’s desire to develop local 
CCTV systems into a national surveillance infrastructure for national security.  The National 
CCTV Strategy [12] argues that CCTV is currently delivered in a piecemeal fashion, that 
there is a need for integrated CCTV infrastructure and a convergence of systems.  It calls for 
a concerted effort to reappraise the provision of CCTV and for the digitisation and 
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standardisation of technology so that integration and convergence is possible; “the 
introduction of digital CCTV systems could provide opportunities for real benefits if the 
technology is harnessed correctly…improving the quality of CCTV images will support the 
development of current, complimentary technologies such as Automatic Number Plate 
Recognition (ANPR) and future technologies such as facial recognition” [12: 8].  The 
reassessment of CCTV based on cost is likely to lead to the further digitisation and 
integration of systems, making them more like security surveillance systems than council 
community safety systems. 
 
Beyond CCTV concerns are emerging about whether the Government’s enthusiasm for 
evidence-based policy is now waning as the results of several programmes are published 
[31].  The review of the implementation of the Crime Reduction Programme in England and 
Wales, which was described as “the biggest single investment in an evidence-based 
approach to crime reduction which has ever taken place in any country” [21: 3] has 
documented many problems [22] and a number of commentators have noted overall failure 
of the programme [23, 28, 38].  For CCTV, the implementation of schemes seems to be at 
complete odds with the evidence base, on which it is supposed to be based, which in turn 
makes it difficult to provide a logical rational reason for installing CCTV surveillance systems 
so quickly and in so many public places. 
 
In the case of CCTV, it appears that policy-makers have used the evidence base selectively.  
To ensure provision crime statistics and anecdotal evidence supporting CCTV has been 
promoted alongside political rhetoric whilst contradictory evidence has been pushed aside, 
along with concerns about privacy and civil liberties.  The newness of the technology has 
meant the evidence base has had to be created with the void willingly filled by proponents of 
the technology.  In the absence of an established evidence base policy-makers have had to 
fall back on the advice of stakeholders and service providers, who are all naturally 
supportive of the technology. 
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 6. Concluding Comments 
In this article I have used a ‘policy’ based approach to review the ongoing provision of CCTV 
in public places across the UK.  A focus on policy is useful because it alerts us to changes in 
the purposes and practices of CCTV surveillance and because it allows us to ask important 
questions about the rationale for ongoing provision.  Initial concerns about CCTV provision 
remain unaddressed and CCTV provision is being extended despite a growing evidence-
base which suggests that the cameras are not as effective as initially assumed.  Ironically it 
is not effectiveness or civil liberties issues that have instigated a policy debate about CCTV, 
but the financial costs associated with running systems and their potential use for national 
security and anti-terrorism purposes.  This demonstrates, that over time sophisticated 
surveillance technologies (in the form of CCTV systems) have become embedded in society, 
and that systems originally installed for one purpose, have evolved, with surveillance being 
normalised and accepted, to take on additional surveillance functions and activities.  This 
surveillance creep has not been accompanied by public debate with low levels of awareness 
about the realities of technologically enhanced surveillance remaining.  Up until now only 
fairly abstract civil liberties arguments have been raised against CCTV, however, if the 
general public were made more aware of the full costs of systems, and their overall lack of 
effectiveness, then attitudes may change and the policy may loose credibility, support and 
momentum. 
 
Reconsidering the evidence base supporting CCTV raises more questions than answers.  
Questions which strike at the heart of modern policy-making procedures.  For example, if the 
motivation for the continued provision of CCTV cannot be explained by the evidence-base 
then how do we account for a policy process that appears to be less than rational?  How has 
the evidence-base been utilised by policy-makers?  And, how are new policy initiatives 
evaluated and assessed?  The latter is intriguing as independent agencies like the Audit 
Commission and Audit Scotland are responsible for assessing the quality and value-for-
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money of public services.  Such questions are likely to become more significant as 
awareness about the limitations of CCTV become more widely known and if there is a 
resistance to a centralised national infrastructure. 
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Table 1. Three CCTV Policy Eras 
Policy Era Policy Characteristics CCTV Diffusion 
Innovation and 
Experimentation 
Early to mid 1990’s 
Central government drive to establish 
policy 
Recognition of potential policy area 
Pilot systems to test feasibility 
Evaluation of performance and technical 
assessment 
Secure public approval 
Allay civil liberties concerns  
Secure political and media support 
Focus on crime prevention 
No legislation or formal controls 
Initial CCTV systems 
Established in town and city 
centres and car parks 
Acceptance and 
Expansion 
Mid 1990’s to early 
2000’s 
Extensive local service delivery 
Policy unquestioned and use of cameras 
accepted 
Home Office funding and guidance 
Extensive pro CCTV discourse 
Formation of partnerships between police 
and local authorities 
Focus extends to antisocial and undesirable 
behaviour (community safety) 
Voluntary codes of conduct 
Non-specific legislation applies 
Emergence of policy networks around CCTV 
Widespread diffusion 
In a variety of public places 
Varied technical specifications 
Retrenchment and 
Centralisation 
Mid 2000’s onwards 
Central government drive to standardise 
policy and practice 
Desire to centralise disparate systems and 
practices 
Concerns about financial cost of running 
systems 
Extensive partnership working 
Focus shifts to national security and 
terrorism 
Pro CCTV discourse reinforced 
Reassessment of technical capabilities 
Continued uptake and 
sophistication 
Computerisation of systems 
Integration of systems 
Expansion of existing systems 
Further technological 
innovation 
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Table 2. The Fallacies and Realities of CCTV Provision in the UK 
CCTV Fallacy CCTV Reality 
1. CCTV cameras work CCTV may reduce crime in certain circumstances 
2. CCTV is everywhere There are limited numbers of public space, publicly 
owned and operated CCTV systems 
3. Citizens want CCTV Public support for CTV is based on a misunderstanding 
about what CCTV can deliver 
4. Citizens understand the technological 
capabilities of CCTV 
There is a very limited awareness of the divergence in 
technological capability between different systems 
5. CCTV is there to protect us and  
to reduce crime 
CCTV fulfils a range of policy objectives, of which crime 
prevention is just one 
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Table 3. A Typology of CCTV Systems 
Type Features 
Proactive Live surveillance from a dedicated control room with recording, storage and 
playback facilities. Allows for an immediate response to incidents as they occur. 
Reactive Recording, storage and playback facilities. Provides access to footage of 
incidents after the event has occurred. 
Non-active No monitoring, storage or playback facilities.  Acts as a visual deterrent by using 
fake ‘cameras’ to create the illusion of surveillance. 
[source: adapted from 39] 
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